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 LANGDELLIAN LIMERICKS 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
Abstract 
Christopher Columbus Langdell 
Used cases to teach the law well.  
So everyone thought, 
Except for distraught 
Students in Socratic hell. 
 
Theirs is no lone cri de coeur. 
Now bashing Langdell’s de rigueur. 
Knowing case law alone, 
A young lawyer is prone 
To resemble a high-priced poseur.   
 
After a part that rehearses 
Anti-Langdellian curses; 
The Author proceeds 
To attend to the needs 
Of students who learn best through verses. 
 
INTRODUCTION............................................................................2 
I.    ELEMENTS OF LANGDELL’S PEDAGOGY .....................6 
II.   LANGDELL’S CRITICS ....................................................13 
III. THE PEDAGOGY OF LANGDELLIAN  
LIMERICKS .......................................................................19 
 A.  Limericks as Aides-Memoires .....................................21 
B.  Limericks as Illustrations of Types of Judicial  
Reasoning ......................................................................26 
 C.  Limericks as Jurisprudential Critique .......................29  
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................33 
                                                 
∗
 Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.  An earlier version of this 
Article was presented at the Spring Contracts Conference, held at the University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas’s William S. Boyd School of Law from February 26-27, 
2010.  The author thanks Catherine Tufariello for frequent uncompensated 
metrical consultations and for her support for younger poets.  Remaining 
metrical infelicities are solely the responsibility of the author. 
2  Law Review 2010 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In introducing the case method as the core of legal education, 
Christopher Columbus Langdell assumed the role as  an initiator of 
a discursive practice.  Discursive practices are not just ways of 
producing discourse.  Rather they “become embodied in technical 
processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms 
for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms.”1  
Langdell’s case method and the related Socratic approach to legal 
education illustrate the propensity of discursive practices to adapt 
and survive long after their original premises have been discarded.2  
As one commentator noted, “One of the strengths of the case-
teaching method, and there are many, lies oddly enough in its 
ability to disprove Langdell’s conception of law.”3  Langdell’s 
pedagogy has survived other aspects of his legal thought precisely 
because the former is an institutionalized discursive practice.4  Law 
professors teach using Langdell’s method in part because that is 
how they learned the law, and in part because the teaching 
materials most readily available to them facilitate teaching through 
the case method.  But inertia alone does not explain Langdell’s 
                                                 
1
 Michel Foucault, History of Systems of Thought, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-
MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY MICHEL 
FOUCAULT 199, 200 (Donald F. Bouchard, ed., 1977) 
2
 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What 
to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 610 (2007) (cataloguing changes since 
the advent of the case method but noting that “we legal educators are still doing 
the same basic thing we were doing one hundred and thirty years ago”); Russell 
L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy, Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 
517, 545 (1991) (observing that Langdell’s method has achieved a dominant 
position in U.S. law schools despite the fact that Langdell’s justification for his 
method “has long since been repudiated”). 
3
 Eric Mills Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering – Case Method in 
a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 556 (1976).  See also John J. 
Costonis, The McCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American 
Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 160 (1993) (observing that Langdell’s 
vision of the law did not survive Legal Realism but his law school did survive); 
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 24 (1983) 
(noting that Langdell’s educational innovations helped undermine his approach 
to legal doctrine).   
4
 See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007) (likening the survival of the case method to 
that of religious traditions that “once embedded in custom and experience, give 
rise to new rationales when the old ones fade away”). 
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resilience.5  Many professors utilize Langdell’s approach because 
they think it is the method best suited to legal education,6 given the 
physical, financial and practical constraints within which law 
schools must operate.7 
Right from the start, Langdell’s method has been subjected to 
fundamental criticisms, and those criticisms have been remarkably 
consistent.8  Many of Langdell’s ideas seemed strange to his 
                                                 
5
 See John C.P. Goldberg, What Nobody Knows, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1461, 
1496 (2006) (rejecting the notion that the case method’s survival can be 
attributed to “some combination of inertia and faculty inattentiveness”).  
6
 See, e.g., Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 598 (crediting Langdell’s 
method with meeting the multiple goals of legal education); Ruta K. Stropus, 
Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School 
Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 449, 50 (1996) 
(describing Langdell’s method as the best means for teaching students to 
analyze effectively, think independently and express themselves verbally”).  
However, Rakoff and Minow conclude that Langdell’s method is no longer 
adequate if the aim is to teach 21st-century students to think like laywers.  60 
VAND. L. REV. at 600 
7
 See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA 
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 63 (1983) (noting that the case method permitted 
law school class sizes to expand to the size of the largest-available lecture halls); 
Costonis, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 160-61 (contending that the case method is a 
more significant economic than pedagogical phenomenon, since it facilitates 
large-class teaching). 
8
 See, e.g., STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 57 (citing criticisms of Langdell’s 
method going back to 1876); James R. Maxeiner, Educating Lawyers Now and 
Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case Method, 35 
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 1 (2007) (noticing that the two Carnegie reports on legal 
education, though separated by three generations, offered materially similar 
criticisms); Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students that I Entertain Heretical 
Opinions, Which They Are Not to Take a Law”: The Inception of Case Method 
Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C.C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 57, 59-61 (1999) (quoting from some of Langdell’s students’ 
negative evaluations of his pedagogy) [hereinafter Kimball, Warn Students]; 
Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 533-537 (detailing the early criticisms of the case 
method as articulated by Langdell’s students, his colleagues and recent Harvard 
Law School alumni).  In 1930, Samuel Williston reviewed J.H. Landman’s The 
Case Method of Studying Law, which recommended that the case method be 
replaced with a problem-based approach and articulated many of the criticisms 
of the case method that we still hear today.  Williston, Book Review, 43 HARV. 
L. REV. 972 (1930).  See also Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s 
Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 241 (1992) (arguing that 
the problem method is better suited than the case method to the taks of moderln 
legal education – to train lawyers rather than to develop a “science of law”); 
Jacob Henry Landman, Anent the Case Method of Studying Law, 4 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 141, 150-54 (1927) (debunking Langdellian notions of law as science); id. 
at 155-59 (proposing what he calls the “project method” as an alternative to the 
case method). 
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contemporaries or near-contemporaries9 and they seem stranger 
still today.10  Langdell’s ideas about the nature of law were clearly 
alien to the Legal Realists,11 and even Langdell’s sympathetic 
biographer describes him as a “misfit.”12   Yet, the case method 
and the Socratic style of teaching persist and are still practiced by 
the vast majority of legal academics, at least in the larger doctrinal 
courses.13  There is no reason to think that law schools will 
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 119-22 (1983) (noting that reports on 
the state of legal education published in the early 20th century found Langdell’s 
case method inefficient and impractical); Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 611 
(observing that, because of the rise of the administrative state,  Langdell’s 
approach to education was already out-of-date one hundred years ago); Paul F. 
Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case against the Case 
System? 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169-70 (1986) (noting that most of Langdell’s 
colleagues regarded the case method as an “abomination”); Franklin G. 
Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 493, 498-
99 (1920) (describing Langdell’s first course in contracts and reporting that most 
students “condemned” Langdell’s approach).  Karl Llewellyn found it hard to 
imagine “a more wasteful method of imparting information about subject matter 
than the case-class.” Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 (1948).  
10
 See John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the 
American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law 
Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 314 (1985) (characterizing Langdell’s 
pedagogical ideas as “daft” and contending that they were viewed as odd by 
Langdell’s contemporaries as well).   
11
 See Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 613, n.9 (summarizing the legal realists’ 
passionate antipathy for Lagndellian formalism).  Jerome Frank dismissed the 
case method as an expression of Langdell’s “peculiar temperament,” which 
Frank regarded as evidencing an obsessive attachment to books and libraries.  
Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyers-School? 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 907-
08 (1933). 
12
 Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of 
Historiography, 1906-2000, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 279 (2004). 
13
 See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY, ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 
207 (2007) (“The principal method for teaching legal doctrine and analytical 
skills in United States’ law schools is the Socratic dialogue and case method.”); 
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK 
LIKE A LAWYER” 141-73 (2007) (discussing literature contending that use of the 
Socratic method is on the wane and concluding that most law professors in the 
first year still rely on some version of a dialogic method, although classic, strict 
Socratic teaching is now a rarity); Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 597 
(observing that the first-year curriculum “remains remarkably similar” to that 
invented by Langdell); Steven I. Friedard, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching 
Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1996) 
(reporting survey results indicating that 97% of law professors teaching first-
year courses employ the case method); Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 543 (calling 
the case method “unquestionably the primary mode of instruction in U.S. law 
schools” and noting that it had been adopted by every U.S. law school). 
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abandon Langdell’s pedagogical model entirely and so there is 
every reason to make that model as responsive as it can be to the 
needs of 21st-century law students.  In part, this goal can be 
achieved by supplementing Langdell’s approach with an eye to 
addressing the concerns raised by its critics.   
The case method survives in part because it is a flexible 
approach to law teaching.  One can always combine Socratic 
teaching with lectures on doctrine, problems, group work, drafting 
exercises and other useful approaches. In employing the case 
method, one can play with Langdell’s method in various ways, one 
of which is the subject of this Article.  In my first years of teaching 
I composed Limericks to memorialize key cases and shared those 
Limericks with my students during class.14  I add to the collection 
of Limericks when I teach new materials or when they seem to 
require some tweaking.  In what follows, I justify this practice as a 
means of accomplishing some of the goals of the case method and 
as a means of addressing some of the criticisms of that method. 
Part I below outlines the main characteristics of Langdell’s 
case method, highlighting its strengths as an educational approach.  
Part II summarizes the leading criticisms of Langdell’s pedagogy.  
Finally, Part III provides a sampling of Limericks which 
summarize some of the cases found in contracts case books and 
discusses how Limericks can be used to achieve pedagogical goals 
consistent with Langdell’s approach.15  In addition, I argue that the 
Limericks help to temper some of the harsher aspects of the 
Socratic method and thus go some way to addressing the concerns 
of Langdell’s critics.   
                                                 
14
 This Article contains only a sampling of the Limericks.  The complete 
collection of my Langdellian Limericks can be found in the appendix.  Those 
interested in seeing more Limericks can find both Contracts and Business 
Associations Limericks on the ContractsProf Blog (the official blog of the 
AALS Section on Contracts): 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/limericks/. 
15
 A discussion of Limericks about contracts cases is especially appropriate 
here, because Langdell introduced his Socratic method in a contracts course. 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASS'N, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL 1817-1917 34-35 (1918) (describing Langdell’s first use of the Socratic 
method, in a discussion with his students of the contracts case, Payne v. Cave).   
Moreover, Langdell’s first case book was designed for his course on contracts 
law.  CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS (1871).  In addition, there is precedent for scholarly 
presentations of Limericks devoted to contracts cases.  Douglass G. Boshkoff, 
More Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts: Raintree County Memorial 
Library Occasional Paper No. 2, 91 NW. L. REV. 295 (1996); Boshkoff, 
Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1533 (1991).  
6  Law Review 2010 
 
I.   ELEMENTS OF LANGDELL’S PEDAGOGY 
Langdell’s pedagogy was an inductive method based on the 
natural sciences.16  Langdell regarded the status of “science” as 
necessary in order to justify the study of law as an academic 
discipline and as a graduate course of study.  If law were not a 
science, wrote Langdell, it would “best be learned by serving an 
apprenticeship to one who practices it.”17  The notion that an 
understanding of law could best be won through apprenticeship to 
a practicing attorney was precisely the model of legal education 
that Langdell strove to overcome.18  Langdell regarded the case 
method as a form of inductive science because he believed that 
legal principles could only be appreciated in the context in which 
they arose.  As a result, Langdell famously and somewhat 
notoriously proclaimed that the laboratory in which legal science 
was to be conducted was the law library, in which appellate 
decisions were collected.19 
Langdell’s conception of law as a science was not very richly 
developed.  In order to master law, Langdell encouraged his 
students to discover basic legal principles or doctrines, which 
Langdell believed to be relatively few in number.20  Langdell 
believed that these principles were best to be discovered in 
appellate court decisions.21  Students educated according to 
Langdell’s method discovered for themselves the development of 
legal rules through an intensive study of case law.22  Langdell 
                                                 
16
 Early defenses of the case method can be found in William A. Keener, 
Methods of Legal Education II, 1 YALE L.J. 143 (1892); Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123 (1887).   
17
 C. C. LANGDELL, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, A RECORD OF THE 
COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHT[H], 1886, ON THE TWO 
HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD 
COLLEGE 97-98 (Cambridge, Mass., 1887). 
18
 See STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 51-64 (describing the struggle between 
Langdell’s followers and those who wanted to continue to employ practitioners 
as law professors). 
19
 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW 
Q. REV. 123,124 (1887). 
20
 LANGDELL, LAW OF CONTRACTS at vii. 
21
 STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 52. 
22
 See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF 
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION  (New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), at 3 (“In Langdell’s formulation, legal education is the 
study of a few fundamental principles that are found in the original sources – 
  Langdellian Limericks 7 
further believed that, through rigorous development of the case-
law approach to legal science, he and his followers could eliminate 
jurisdictional deviations from ideal legal practices and thus 
establish a “unitary, self-contained, value-free and consistent set of 
principles” that could be applied to any case that might arise.23  
Langdell thus aimed to use his scientific approach to legal 
education to train a generation of lawyers and legal reformers who 
could perfect the law as a system of neutral, predictable, practical, 
efficient rules.   
An unstated assumption of Langdell’s method was that law 
was synonymous with judge-made law; that is, the common law.24  
Langdell developed his approach to the law before the rise of the 
administrative state in the United States.25  As the 20th-century 
progressed, the limitations of Langdell’s notion that casebooks 
could be used as primary sources of law grew increasingly 
obvious, as did the limitations of the analogical reasoning that the 
case method helped students develop.26  It thus has become 
relatively easy to enumerate aspects of Langdell’s pedagogy that 
have become anachronistic.  But law professors should not lose 
track of the advantages of the case method, as it remains a central 
feature of legal education.  Legal scholars owe it to their students 
and to their students’ future clients to make the case method as 
responsive as possible to the needs of law students and the legal 
profession.   
To that end, it is important to keep in mind the strengths of the 
case method, which have been a reason for its survival27 even 
                                                                                                       
cases – and, by implication, are derived from those cases by the process of 
induction.  Thus the student thinks for himself rather than merely accepts the 
secondhand formulation of some treatise writer.”). 
23
 STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 53.  Langdell was aware that not all legal 
opinions could be reconciled, but he believed he could identify cases that 
proceeded “from an erroneous principle” and therefore must “be regarded as 
anomalous.”  Kimball, Warn Students, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. at 68 (quoting from 
Langdell’s lecture notes). 
24
 Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 616. 
25
 Id. at 617-20. 
26
 See id. at 622 (concluding that Langdell’s method does not train students 
“to think like lawyers in the contemporary administrative state”). 
27
 Previous scholarship has identified five main strengths associated with 
Socratic teaching:  It helps students to develop analytical skills; it forces them to 
think on their feet, it encourages intellectual rigor, teaches students about legal 
process and helps them learn about the lawyer’s role or function.  Cnythia G. 
Hawkins-León, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy The Debate 
Over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 5 (1988) (citing 
8  Law Review 2010 
 
though Langdell himself may not have been recognized those 
advantages.28  As we shall see, each strength of the case method 
can also be a weakness.29  That is, all aspects of the case method 
have come under attack and there is clearly room for improvement 
in the way law professors teach through cases and through the 
Socratic method. 
The primary advantage of Langdell’s method is that it 
promotes active learning.30  Because students come to class 
knowing that they will be called upon and that they risk appearing 
foolish if they are unprepared, they have an incentive to work hard 
on their own (or in groups) to gain at least a rudimentary grasp of 
the material rather than expecting to be told its significance.31   
Through their exposure to case law, students learn to distinguish 
                                                                                                       
Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 549-61).   In what follows, I have organized the 
discussion of the strengths of Langdell’s method a bit differently in order to 
situate the strengths of the Langdellian method in the context in which they 
arise. 
28
 Langdell’s pedagogy was consistent with some of the groundbreaking 
educational reforms of the late 19th century, but there is no evidence that 
Langdell was aware of his intellectual kinship with the leading educational 
reformers of his day. Charles Eliot, who as Harvard’s President appointed 
Langdell to be Dean of the Harvard Law School, believed that Langdell had no 
familiarity with the likes of Pestalozzi, Froebel, Seguin and Montessori but 
nonetheless implemented their ideas.  Charles Eliot, Langdell and the Law 
School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1920).   In general, Langdell seems to have 
developed his pedagogical strategy by intuition, without the aid or support of 
any empirical evidence or immersion in educational theory.  See Michael L. 
Richmond, Teaching Law to Passive Learners: The Contemporary Dilemma of 
Legal Education, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 943, 946-47 (1996) (finding no indication in 
Langdell’s writings that he believed the case method to be more effective than 
lectures).  
29
 See Costonis, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 160 (remarking that the strengths of 
the case method are also weaknesses). 
30
 See JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE 
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 12 (1914) (observing that, 
through the case method, “the intellectual labor . . .is to be performed by the 
students, quite independently” even though under the teacher’s guidance); 
Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. at 943 (1996) (“Legal education depends on the 
active involvement of students in the learning process.”); Stropus, 27 Loy. U. 
Chi. L. J. at 466 (observing that Langdell’s method “encourages preparedness as 
a necessary component of analysis”). 
31
 Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 552-53.  Karl Llewellyn acknowledged the 
“obvious” value of the case method, including its ability to “enlist active 
participation from many, and also silent participation of a whole group.”   
Llewellyn, Current Crisis, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 211. 
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relevant from irrelevant facts, to identify the significant issues 
raised in the case and should come to distinguish among levels of 
argumentative rigor in legal opinions.  Langdell developed his 
method in order to combat the passivity of legal education as he 
had experienced it, in which students sat, listened, and perhaps 
took notes as the instructor lectures them on legal doctrine.32  
While contemporary legal reformers would like to go beyond 
Langdell in promoting active education, few have argued that a 
return to lectures on legal doctrine would benefit students.33  To 
this extent, Langdell’s revolution must be accounted a step in the 
right direction.   
Of almost equal importance, Langdell’s method is designed to 
help students think like lawyers.34  It does so by replicating many 
of the mental tasks the students will be asked to perform once they 
become attorneys.35  Here, the fact that the case method requires 
active learning is crucial, since once they get into practice, students 
cannot expect the legal issues to be identified in advance, nor can 
they approach legal material knowing in advance what they are 
looking to find there.36   
The case method trains students to think like lawyers in at least 
four areas.  First, the case method can be used to encourage 
students to make the best possible arguments for their clients given 
the facts of the case and the legal doctrines in play.37  The Socratic 
                                                 
32
 See Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 329, 336-37 (1979) (remarking that the lecture method, the 
standard mode of teaching before the advent of the case method, “often left the 
majority of students in dazed incomprehension”). 
33
 See Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. at 950 (noting that legal educators 
developing alternatives to the case method have all “proceeded from the same 
assumption: that law students would learn best when they took an active role in 
the process”).  
34
 See, e.g., MERTZ, at vii (2007) (noting that students in the first year of law 
school are reputed to undergo an intellectual transformation in which they learn 
to think like a lawyer); Chase, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. at 342 (“In the popular 
reference, the case method sought to teach the uninitiated law student how to 
think like a lawyer.”). 
35
 See STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 56 (“[T]he student is practically doing, 
under the guidance of an instructor, what he will be required to do without 
guidance as a lawyer.”). 
36
 See Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. at 944 (highlighting the challenges of 
teaching “contemporary students who do not know how to learn by doing”). 
37
 See MERTZ, at 59 (acknowledging the parallels between Socratic dialogue 
and courtroom discourse, as well as the suitability of Socratic teaching to a legal 
10  Law Review 2010 
 
method facilitates such role-playing – the instructor simply asks a 
student to indentify each party’s best arguments, or best arguments 
with respect to a certain issue.  If such questioning produces only 
puzzlement, the instructor can attempt further gentle, Socratic 
prodding by asking which facts are especially helpful or harmful to 
either party and which legal theories appear most promising.  Such 
exchanges might also range into policy discussions if, for example, 
neither the facts nor the law are especially helpful to one side or 
the other, students can be encouraged to draw on policy 
considerations to formulate arguments on behalf of that party.38 
Second, the case method introduces law students to the concept 
of precedent.39  It provides not only an introduction to the doctrine 
but also provides ample opportunities for students to experience 
the complexities of precedent.   This aspect of the case method 
relates to the first in that, in deciding whether or not a particular 
precedent applies to the case at hand, students must consider the 
peculiar facts of the case and determine whether the precedent 
really applies or whether the facts are distinct enough to fall 
outside of the precedent or even to raise separate legal issues that 
remove it from the doctrinal realm of that precedent entirely. 
Third, the case method introduces and gives students exposure 
to the canons of both contractual and statutory construction.  While 
the case method introduces students to canons of construction in 
the litigation context, knowledge of such canons can also be of use 
to them in drafting courses and thus can contribute to training in 
transactional work and even can prepare them for careers in 
legislation or law reform. 
Fourth, the case method trains students in critical reading and 
thinking.  The case method does not encourage students to take the 
holding of a case as a given.  Rather, students are encouraged to 
                                                                                                       
system in which “both parties get their day in court, represented by attorneys 
who will engage in vigorous linguistic combat on their behalf”).  
38
 Dennis Patterson provides the example of a popular casebook that begins 
with a case about the termination of an at-will employment agreement.  The 
casebook provides questions about the case for the students to consider, 
including questions that invite students to consider whether the common law of 
contracts is efficient and to consider the case from the perspectives of critical 
legal studies and feminism.  See Dennis Patterson, Langdell’s Legacy, 90 
NORTHW. U. L. REV. 196, 202 (1995) (citing CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. 
CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (3d ed. 
1993)). 
39
 Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 553-58. 
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question the reasoning underlying the decision and even to 
question whether the case truly stands for the principle for which it 
is supposed to stand.40  Here, a professor can expect considerable 
resistance coming from two directions.  First, students often 
emerge from their undergraduate educations with a form of 
reverence for textual authority.  Encouraging such respect for 
authors is an important step in the educational process – one ought 
first to appreciate Shakespeare’s gifts before proceeding to a 
denunciation of his phallogocentrism.  Still, by law school, 
students ought to be able to both appreciate and criticize.  Second, 
many students see law school as a professional training program.  
They are practically-minded and want to take away from each class 
period only useful information.  Questioning a legal rule does not 
seem much to the purpose for students who think that law school is 
an opportunity to learn the law, understood as a body of rules.   
Finally, because of its flexibility, the case method provides 
ample opportunity to introduce students to aspects of the law aside 
from doctrine.  While the cases that are the focus of the case 
method are almost invariably appeals, that does not mean that the 
procedural history through which they get to the appellate courts is 
not a proper subject for class discussion.  In fact, the important 
differences between appellate review of motions for dismissal or 
summary judgment and appellate review of trial court decisions 
following trial are often much easier for students to grasp when 
they see the play of doctrines learned in civil procedure courses at 
work in other doctrinal courses.   
The case method also provides myriad opportunities to raise 
questions of legal strategy, including questions of settlement or 
alternative dispute resolution.41  Most casebooks include at least 
one case in which the amount in controversy is so small as to raise 
questions about why the parties went to the trouble to appeal.  
Casebooks also often include examples of cases in which 
potentially winning legal issues were not raised by the parties.    
Related to questions of strategy and settlement are also issues of 
legal ethics.  One can raise such issues with respect to nearly every 
case and thus one challenge of teaching using the case method is 
                                                 
40
 See STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES at 214 (encouraging law professors 
to use hypotheticals in the context of Socratic discussion to “demonstrate 
complexity and indeterminacy of legal analysis”). 
41
 See id. at 558-61 (explaining that the case method can help students 
understand the lawyer’s function in both the litigation and non-litigation 
contexts, and can teach them to develop arguments and their own advocacy 
skills). 
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picking the right opportunity to introduce students to particular 
questions of legal ethics.   
Similarly, no semester of case method teaching passes without 
some occasion to discuss issues of legal theory and adjudication.  
When students are called upon to address the policy implications 
of a certain legal rule or of a challenge to that rule, they inevitably 
must consider the purposes of the law and justify their preferences 
for certain rules with respect to their own perhaps inchoate notions 
of the relationship of legal rules and social justice, economic 
efficiency or morality.  Nor does the semester pass without several 
occasions in which a court does not give the legislature or 
administrative agency the deference theoretically due to it or in 
which a federal court decides an issue of state law in a manner 
arguably at odds with evidence of the state supreme court’s views 
on the matter.  Such cases provide an opportunity to raise a 
different set of policy questions, relating to the role of courts and 
of institutional competence more generally. 
The facts of cases themselves provide an additional opportunity 
to enlighten students (or remind them) that many if not most legal 
practices are businesses in which knowledge of other businesses 
assists attorneys in advising and guiding their clients.  Cases often 
include fascinating details that are in fact slices of commercial life, 
exposing students to the sort of commercial interactions with 
which they are going to have to get comfortable if they are going 
to develop a thriving commercial practice.  As two of Langdell’s 
more insightful critics have acknowledged, Langdell’s method: 
…was constructed to address simultaneously several 
different questions, each of which must be answered for 
a professional school curriculum to succeed with all of 
its constituencies and in all of its domains.  The 
Langdellian case method afforded a way to 
communicate information; to cultivate a style of 
reasoning and questioning that was intellectually 
respectable, yet also well-suited to the paradigmatic law 
practice of adjudication;, and to engage the attention 
and interests of large numbers of students at relatively 
little expense for instruction and materials.42 
In short, Langdell’s innovation was a tremendous improvement 
over the modes of instruction that preceded it, and it survives 
                                                 
42
 Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 598. 
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because of it still responds to the demands of the legal academy.  
But that does not mean that Langdell’s method is without its 
weaknesses.   
II.      LANGDELL’S CRITICS 
From today’s perspective, it is rather difficult to grasp why or 
in what way Langdell thought the case method was “scientific.”43  
He conflated notions of science associated with Baconian 
induction44 with German notions of science (Wissenschaft) as a 
self-contained body of knowledge deduced from fundamental 
principles.45  Grant Gilmore thus famously concluded that 
Langdell must have been an “essentially stupid man.”46  Gilmore’s 
judgment is harsh in part because it is ahistorical.  Langdell 
developed his method prior to the advent of the social scientific 
models that have now come to dominate theories of legal 
method.47  Fortunately, one does not have to buy into Langdell’s 
positivistic hokum to appreciate the value of having students come 
to their own understanding of how legal rules arise through the 
seeming chaos of the common law process.48   
                                                 
43
 See Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 635 (concluding that Langdell’s notions 
that law is a natural science or should follow the methodologies of the natural 
sciences “no longer makes sense”); John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Auto-da-fé, 
17 LAW & HIST. REV. 149, 149 (1999) (providing a post-Realist critique of 
Langdell’s idea of science). 
44
 See STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 52 (“Although Langdell talked of science 
in a nineteenth-century way, his vision of legal science would have been 
acceptable to Bacon); Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The 
Model of Natural Sciences in Nineteenth Century American Legal Education, 17 
LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 459 (1999) (describing Langdell’s approach as 
“Protestant Baconism”).  Others think Langdell’s notions of inductive science 
more indebted to Darwin (Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as 
Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. 
REV. 1, 2-4 (1980)), or to Louis Agassiz.  Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 633-34. 
45
 See Laura A. Appelman, The Rise of the Modern American Law School: 
How Professionalization, German Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our 
System of Legal Education, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 251, 274-89 (2005) 
(explaining the German idea of Wissenschaft and its influence on Langdell and 
on U.S. legal education more generally); STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 53 (noting 
that Langdell viewed himself as trying to put American law faculties in the 
position of such faculties in continental Europe). 
46
 GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977). 
47
 Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 636. 
48
 See, e.g., Schlegel, Landell’s Auto-da-fé, 17 LAW & HIST. at 153 
(praising Langdell for engaging his students while conceding that Langdell did 
not himself understand what he was doing); Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 466 
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Other critics have articulated more fundamental criticisms of 
the case method.49  Such critics challenge each of the claimed 
benefits of the Langdellian method: it does not really promote 
active learning; it does not adequately teach students to think like 
lawyers; and thus it is ultimately not nearly as practical or useful as 
are rival approaches, such as problems, simulations or clinical 
legal education. 
According to such critics, Langdell’s method is based on an 
outmoded pedagogy, already superseded in the early 20th century 
by Dewey’s pragmatic theory of education.50  Langdell’s approach 
assumes a pre-existing body of law that students passively learn 
rather than learning to think of the law as something that they will 
have a hand in shaping.51  Students read cases with an eye to 
learning a rule of law rather than analyzing cases to learn legal 
methods.52  Moreover, the case method and Socratic questioning 
do not really promote active learning because Socratic method 
“humiliates, intimidates and silences students.”53  Because a 
student’s success at answering a law professor’s questions may 
                                                                                                       
(“The successful Langdellian dialogue goes beyond the rule of law and 
challenges students to probe the legal consequences of the argument, to make 
distinctions, and to place an order on things.”); John Chipman Gray, Letter to 
the Editors of the Yale Law Journal, reprinted in Methods of Legal Instruction, 
1 YALE L. J. 139, 159 (1892) (describing how reading cases heightens student 
interest in legal material). 
49
 Bruce Kimball has uncovered extensive evidence that at least some of 
these criticisms should not apply to the teaching style of Langdell himself.  
Kimball, Warn Students, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. at 66-77.  Kimball also attempts 
a historical reconstruction of Langdell’s class sessions to illustrate his 
conception of Langdell’s method in practice.  Id. at 91-131.  But the critics are 
less interested in Langdell’s practice than in the case method and Socratic 
teaching more generally, which in many instances fall short of Langdell’s 
practice, as reconstructed by Kimball. 
50
 Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 646. 
51
 Id. at 649; see also Llewellyn, Current Crisis, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 212 
(faulting the case method for providing solutions to the problems posed in 
advance and thus not encouraging students to develop their own powers of 
reasoning and problem-solving). 
52
 See Hawkins-León, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L. J. at 6 (citing a 1942 
report of the AALS committee n teaching and examination methods). 
53
 James R. Beattie, Jr., Socratic Ignorance: Once More Into the Cave, 105 
W. VA. L. REV. 471, 472 (2003); see also Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 456 
(citing critics who claim that the Socratic method causes psychological 
scarring). 
  Langdellian Limericks 15 
only lead to further questioning until the student cracks,54 some 
student respond to the Socratic method by refusing to play along.55  
They prefer to pass or to play the role of genuine stooge rather than 
that of Socratic stooge.56 
In terms of training students to think like lawyers, critics of 
Langdell’s method contend that it “does little to orient students to 
the reality of unfolding problems with facts still to be enacted, 
client conduct still to take place, and procedural settings still to be 
chosen and framed.”57  In the case method, lawsuits are ripped 
from their historical and social contexts and thus sterilized so that 
students cannot understand the full ramifications of legal 
decisions.58  In any case, the case method exposes students almost 
exclusively to appellate decisions and thus provides students with 
very limited opportunities to develop practical skills related to the 
development of litigation strategies at the pre-trial or trial stages, 
which constitutes the focus of the vast majority of litigation 
practices.59  As a result the case law falls short in the practical area 
for which it is best suited: it does not adequately train lawyers even 
in the skills necessary to litigation-oriented law practices.60 
                                                 
54
 See Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: 
Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 93, 123 (1968) 
(noting that students perceive the Socratic method as offering few rewards for 
good performance, as the professors response to every answer is simply another 
question). 
55
 See B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CONN. L. 
REV. 627, 627 (1991) (contending that students respond to the stress of the first 
year of law school by “refusing to play the game” through passivity or 
aggression or by simply dropping out). 
56
 See Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 459 (observing that some students 
opt out of the Socratic game by passing or claiming to be unprepared, while 
others attempt to beat the professor at her own game by humiliating fellow 
students). 
57
 Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. 600. 
58
 See Moskovitz, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 245-47 (arguing that the problem 
method better mirrors what practicing lawyers do and thus prepares students to 
“think like lawyersbetter than the case method can do); Karl Llewellyn, On the 
Problem of Teaching “Private” Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 775, 779 (1941) 
(advocating a greater focus on problem solving after the first year of law 
school). 
59
 See Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 461 (noting that students might 
conclude based on their law school experiences that practical litigation skills are 
of little value or consequence); Moskovitz, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 244-45 
(criticizing the case method for failing to train lawyers or prepare them for 
practice). 
60
 ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 146 (1953) 
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More obviously, the case method overemphasizes case law and 
underestimates the importance of statutes and rules promulgated by 
administrative agencies.61  The case method exaggerates the 
adversarial role of the attorney and does not prepare students for 
transactional or legislative careers,62 nor does it adequately 
introduce students to alternative modes of dispute resolution.  Thus 
a report conducted on behalf of the Clinical Legal Education 
Association described the “unfortunate reality” that “law schools 
are simply not committed to making their best efforts to prepare all 
of their students to enter the practice settings that await them.”63 
In addition to this immanent critique of Langdell’s method, 
critics contend that Langdell’s method is especially off-putting for 
women and minority students and thus stacks the deck against non-
traditional students at the very start of their legal careers.64  From a 
“relational feminist”65 perspective, associated with Carol Gilligan66 
and Lani Guinier,67 the Socratic method has been described as a 
                                                 
61
 See REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD, 41 (noting 
that the case law encourages an analysis of separate cases but does not offer 
students the opportunity to appreciate the law as a whole); Rubin, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. at 631 (“[T]he first-year curriculum remains captive to the refuted 
glorification of the common law.”). 
62
 See HARNO, at 140-44 (arguing that law school instruction does not 
prepare students for the problems they will have to address in practice); Rubin, 
60 VAND. L. REV. at 641 (observing with regret that transactional law is 
virtually absent from the traditional law school curriculum). 
63
 STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES at 18. 
64
 Andrea Kayne Kaufman, The Logician Versus the Linguist – An 
Empirical Tale of Functional Discrimination in the Legal Academy, 8 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 247 (2002) (arguing that law school education functionally 
discriminates against women); Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 462-65 
(summarizing scholarship that contends that the case method reflects “white 
male” ways of thinking and encourages students who are “assertive, 
argumentative, confrontational, controlling, impersonal, logical and abstract”). 
65
 See e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY 53-60 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the impact of Carol Gilligan’s “cultural 
feminism” or “relational feminism” on the law); Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. 
Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights and the 
Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 860 (1993) (identifying Gillgan 
as the scholar who has “most notably” developed the relational feminist 
perspective). 
66
 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (6th ed. 1993). 
67
 LANI GUINER, MICHELLE FINE AND JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: 
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997). 
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form of “ritualized combat” in which women are not socialized to 
engage.68  Guinier and her co-authors argue that the Socratic 
method “devalues and distorts those characteristics traditionally 
associated with women such as empathy, relational logic and non-
aggressive behavior.”69  By contrast, the Langdellian method is 
alleged to reflect “white male values” by encouraging students to 
be assertive, argumentative, confrontational, impersonal, logical 
and abstract.70  As this summary indicates, such criticisms of law 
school pedagogy seem indebted to essentialist notions of 
womanhood that many feminists have now rejected.71  However, 
Guinier and her co-authors provide strong evidence that men far 
outperform women in law school, as measured by grades and 
membership in prestigious extracurricular activities such as law 
review.72  They argue that the Socratic method, in which professors 
may intimidate or belittle students, contributes to a hostile learning 
environment for women,73 and the women law students 
interviewed for their study self-reported feeling intimidated and 
belittled by their professors and by their peers.74   
                                                 
68
 Lani Guinier, et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One 
Ivey League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994). 
69
 Id. at 80.   
70
 Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 463.  
71
 See e.g., ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF 
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT ix-x (1988) (criticizing Western feminist 
thought for treating the expiences of White, middle-class women as 
representative of all women’s experience); Karlan & Ortiz, 87 NW. U. L. REV. at 
860 (characterizing relational feminism as “somewhat dangerous and 
misguided”); Deborah L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist 
Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1786 (1991) 
(acknowledging the contributions of “relational” feminism inspired by 
Gilligan’s work but noting that its emphasis on the contrast between male-
associated abstract rationality and female-associated interpersonal relationships 
“reinforces longstanding stereotypes that have restricted opportunities for both 
sexes”); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 807 
(1989) (accusing relational feminists of attempting to “reclaim the compliments 
of Victorian gender ideology while rejecting the insults”). 
72
 Guinier, et al., 143 U. PA. L. REV. at 59. 
73
 Id. at 46-47; see also id. at 63 (arguing that the performative aspects of 
Socratic teaching also discourage women’s participation); Taunya Lovell Banks, 
Gender Bias in the Classroom (2), 14 SOUTH. ILL. U. L. J. 527, 531-33 (1990) 
(describing behavior by professors that discourages participation by women). 
74
 Id. at 51-52; see also Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom (2), 14 
SOUTH. ILL. U. L. J. at 533 (identifying hostility from male students as a 
challenge that women law students face); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in 
the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137, 146 (1988) (concluding based on a 
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Others have reported on similar responses among law students 
intending to pursue careers in public interest law,75 working-class 
students76 and minority students.77  While the latest studies indicate 
that fewer law students express dissatisfaction with their law 
school experience, students of color and women continue to be 
disproportionately represented among the deeply dissatisfied 
students.78  Unfortunately, there is no evidence that legal educators 
have hit upon a pedagogy that disadvantages women and minority 
students any less than does the Socratic method.79 
All of these criticisms need to be taken into account by those 
committed to a legal pedagogy best suited to the task of preparing 
law students for the challenges they will face after they graduate.  
Still, too often in the feeding frenzy of self-criticism, legal scholars 
have been remiss in failing to recognize the advantages of 
                                                                                                       
survey of 753 law students that women feel excluded in the law school 
classroom environment and that it makes them feel inferior). 
75
 See ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT 
HARVARD AND BEYOND 106 (1992) (concluding that women who entered law 
school “with a committment to social justice tended to experience [Harvard Law 
S]chool as a sexist and dehumanizing institution”). 
76
 See id. at 109-22 (finding that working class students at Harvard reported 
more anxiety and stress than did more affluent students and that working class 
students often succeeded in law school by abandoning any commitment to their 
working class identities). 
77
 See Nancy Dowd, et al., Diversity Matters: Race, Gender and Ethnicity in 
Legal Education, 15 U. FL. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 11, 34 (2003) (concluding, based 
on data gathered from surveys, that race, ethnicity and gender significantly 
affect students’ experiences with legal education);  Banks, 14 SOUTH. ILL. U. L. 
J. at 536 (1990) (finding African American students were far more likely than 
white students to find their professors disrespectful of their comments and likely 
to embarrass or put down their students).  Unfortunately, there have been very 
few empirical studies of the impact of Socratic teaching and the case method on 
minority students.  See MERTZ, at 174 (“Indeed, with few notable exceptions, 
there has been little systematic empirical attention to the effects of race . . . on 
students’ experiences.”).  The empirical studies that do exist as to the law school 
experience of students of color are all based on students’ self-reporting.  Id. at 
178  Still, these studies routinely show that students of color respond 
disproportionately negatively to Socratic teaching.  Id. at 178-79.   
78
 Mitu Gulati, et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the 
Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 266 (2001).  
79
 See Linda Whiteman, Women in Legal Education: A Comparison of the 
Law School Performance and Law School Experiences of Women and Men 113 
(Law School Admission Council, 1996) (concluding that women law students 
performed no better in courses taught by alternative methods than they did in 
courses taught using the Socratic method). 
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Langdell’s approach over the traditional lecture.  Having taught 
history on the undergraduate level, I am most appreciative of the 
Socratic requirement that students come to class prepared and 
engaged.  The experience may not always be pleasant for students 
who are shy or otherwise reluctant to speak in class, but on the 
whole, the case method promotes a brand of active learning that is 
often sadly lacking on the undergraduate level.80  Indeed, one of 
the greatest challenges I have experienced in legal education is to 
get the students to transcend the rote repetition of information 
imparted during class time and to engage in the constructive play 
with legal concepts and strategies that is the stuff of real advocacy.  
Too many students sail through their undergraduate educations 
without ever being really challenged to engage with difficult 
material in a creative and yet disciplined manner.   
III. THE PEDAGOGY OF LANGDELLIAN 
LIMERICKS81 
This Part illustrates how one can supplement the case method 
with legal Limericks in a way that tempers the naive scientism, 
formalism, intimidation of students and other-worldliness that can 
characterize Socratic courses.  Limericks are not a panacea.  There 
are innumerable other ways in which Langdell’s method can be – 
and has been – improved upon.  This Part consists of a presentation 
of legal Limericks, most of which summarize a case, with an 
explanation of how each Limerick can be used to achieve a 
pedagogical goal in connection with the case method. 
The Limericks are first and foremost little jokes and pokes that 
reduce the anxiety that the Socratic method can induce.  Often, the 
joke is on the professor.  This is intentional.  The Limericks can 
have a leveling effect that suspends the adversarial nature of the 
Socratic method.  The suspension is temporary, but its effects spill 
over and contribute to a more collaborative learning environment.  
The Limericks level because Limericks are silly and also because 
                                                 
80
 See generally Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 943. 
81
 A colleague objected that my poems are not really Limericks because 
Limericks are supposed to be bawdy and mine generally are not.  Research 
suggests that Limericks, while often colorful, need not be lubricious.  For 
example, the celebrated nonsense poet Edward Lear is among the most prolific 
of limericists, and his Limericks are quite tame.  See EDWARD LEAR, THE 
COMPLETE VERSE AND OTHER NONSENSE 328-82 (Vivien Noakes, ed. 2002).  
Some students have objected to my Limericks on the ground that Limericks are 
supposed to be funny, or at least clever, and mine, they tell me, are neither.  But 
see id. 
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they don’t all work.  Sometimes there are obvious metrical 
stumbles, comic inversions or absurdly forced rhymes.  More 
often, they present only the most simple-minded renditions of the 
facts and law of the case.  When the students laugh at the 
Limerick, they are in effect laughing at the professor, and perhaps 
to some extent at the case method, the legal profession and their 
careerist selves, but the laughter is not malicious.   
For example, many contracts professors use Ricketts v. 
Scothorn82 to introduce the doctrine of promissory estoppel.  The 
Ricketts court enforced a grandfather’s gratuitous promise to his 
granddaughter, Katie, to set aside $2000 for her.83  In reliance on 
this promise, Katie quit her job.  The case teaches well, but the 
award of full expectation damages is troubling, given that Katie 
resumed work after her grandfather stopped paying her an annuity 
on the principal he had set aside for her.84  If the purpose of 
damages in such a case is to permit Katie to recover her reliance 
interest, the award of expectation damages in this case is 
extravagant.85  The Limerick reflects the difficulty of fitting the 
doctrine of estoppel into contracts law: 
This was the start of estoppel: 
Said Grandpa to Katie, “Poppop’ll 
Set you up nice.” 
She took his advice, 
And left her old job in the shop-pel. 
 
Such imperfections may reflect poorly on the poet, but they are 
intended to indicate that often in law, we cannot get the cases to do 
exactly what we want them to do.  They do not always stand for 
clear rules or thoughtful legal reasoning.  Often the best response 
to a case really is bemusement or befuddlement.  Students should 
not always be too concerned if they cannot make sense of a case, 
nor should they always treat cases as authoritative statements of 
the law to be passively absorbed and obeyed.  The Limericks thus 
help cultivate a healthy skepticism regarding the law. 
                                                 
82
 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). 
83
 Id. at 367. 
84
 See id. at 366 (finding that plaintiff was out of work for about a year and 
then found a position with the consent and assistance of her grandfather). 
85
 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936). 
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Another example of a perhaps usefully unsuccessful 
Limerick is this attempt at an explication of Judge Cardozo’s 
opinion in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County 
Bank.86  In his virtuoso opinion, Judge Cardozo found a way to 
hold a woman to her charitable pledge despite the fact that as Leon 
Lipson described it, he could not really base his decision on the 
solidly established doctrine of consideration, because the facts did 
not really support such a conclusion.  Nor could he base his 
decision on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which the facts 
might have supported, because the doctrine was not yet firmly 
established.87  Lipson likened Cardozo’s opinion to a thaumatrope, 
in which two images are depicted on different sides of a card – for 
example, a bird on one side and a cage on the other.  When the 
card is twirled, we see an image of a bird in a cage.88  Cardozo’s 
opinion thus arrives at a fair resolution through a sort of sleight of 
hand.  This Limerick imitates that trick by merging two words into 
one forced rhyme: 
Although her estate was inheritable, 
Ms. Johnston chose to be charitable. 
A bargain was struck; 
Her heir’s out of luck: 
To the College, Cardozo was fairitable. 
 
Perhaps Cardozo attempted to do what he considered fair and 
equitable to the college in the case; perhaps he was just being 
charitable.  Paint both options on a thaumatrope and spin it: 
students might see “fairitable.” 
A.   Limericks as Aides-Memoires 
One advantage of the case method is that the cases often 
involve colorful facts, which can serve as a sort of memory hook 
on which to hang an article of legal doctrine.  However, students 
learn in different ways,89 which is, by the way, also a reason to use 
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 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
87
 Leon Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23 YALE L. REP. 8, 11 (1977). 
88
 Id.  But see Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, 
Consideration and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 149, 161-62 
(2005) (arguing that the parties did not really brief the issue of promissory 
estoppel and that the doctrine played little role in the opinion). 
89
 See, e.g. Benjamin V. Madison, III, The Elephant in Law School 
Classrooms: Overuse of the Socratic Method as an Obstacle to Teaching 
Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 293, 312-15 (2008) (noting 
the increasing recognition on the part of law school professors of the need to 
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PowerPoint in the classroom.  Reading a case, and even listening 
as others engage in Socratic dialogue with the professor, may not 
be sufficient to lodge the facts of the case, along with the attendant 
rule, in each student’s mind.  The Limericks attempt to reinforce 
the legal rules by presenting the facts and the rules of the cases in a 
format that will be more likely to survive the other batteries to 
which the 1L mind is subject.  Students who have an ear for meter 
and rhyme – or who develop such an ear through exposure to 
scores of legal Limericks – may find that the Limericks aid them in 
remembering which cases are associated with which rules.   
Ray v. William G. Eurice Bros.,90 illustrates both the objective 
theory of contracts with respect to intent to be bound and the 
nature of contracts damages.  The Eurice Brothers signed an 
agreement to build a house for Mr. Ray.91  But when the Eurice 
brothers took a closer look at Mr. Ray’s specifications, they 
realized that their company could not possibly build the house to 
Mr. Ray’s specifications for the contract price.92  They refused to 
perform, and the trial court was inclined to take pity on these 
humble builders, whom the trial judge described as “hatchet and 
saw men,”93 but the appellate court would not permit them to 
escape the contract.94 
Ray’s specs were enough to confound 
These “hatchet and saw” men, whose ground 
For breaching the pact 
Was mistake of fact, 
But they signed it and so they are bound. 
The Limerick reinforces the simple rule of the case: absent fraud, 
duress, incapacity or mistake, a party is bound by what she signs.95 
                                                                                                       
accommodate students’ differing learning styles); Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, 
Taking Back the Law School Classroom: Using Technology to Foster Active 
Student Learning, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 565 (2004) (proposing an approach to 
legal education that students “come into the classroom with multiple forms of 
intelligence acquired in different ways”). 
90
 93 A.2d 272 (Md. 1952). 
91
 Id. at 275. 
92
 Id. at 275-76. 
93
 Id. at 276. 
94
 Id. at 279. 
95
 Id. at 278. 
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Few cases are more Limerickworthy than Mills v. Wyman,96 in 
which Seth Wyman stiffs Daniel Mills, a good Samaritan who 
nursed Seth’s son Levi in what the court believed to be Levi’s last 
hours.97   
Seth Wyman’s interior forum 
Is not the law’s sanctum sanctorum 
With this none would quarrel: 
Seth’s conduct’s immoral. 
Still, he breaches not law but decorum. 
The Mills v. Wyman Limerick summarizes the rule of the case, but 
it also invites discussion and reflection on the relationship of law 
and morality, a theme to which it is important to return throughout 
the course.98 
Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly99 illustrates the 
difficulty of using the doctrine of mistake to excuse performance 
of a contract.  The case turned on the court’s assessment of which 
party bore the risk of mistake.100  Messerly involved a transfer of a 
residential property that had an insufficient sewage disposal 
system, a fact discovered only after the transfer to Carl and Nancy 
Pickles had taken place.101  Ordinarily, one would expect the seller 
to be the party best positioned to discover such an imperfection in 
the property and thus we would expect the assumption of risk to 
favor the buyer.  But this transfer provided for delivery of the 
property in an “as is” condition and that language defeated the 
buyer’s excuse of mistake.102 
 
The waste leaked in torrents, not trickles. 
                                                 
96
 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825). 
97
 The court turned out to be wrong about that, as Geoffrey R. Watson has 
shown is his wonderful law story, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. 
Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1749 (1997). 
98
 There has been a recent revival of scholarly interest in the relationship of 
contract law to morality.  See, e.g., Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract 
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) and three responses thereto 
published in Harvard Law Review’s online Forum: Barbara H. Fried, What’s 
Morality Got to Do with It? 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 53 (2007), Liam Murphy, 
Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 10 (2007), Charles Fried, The 
Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2007).  This is 
a topic that strikes a chord with many students.  
99
 331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 1980). 
100
 Id. at 210-11. 
101
 Id. at 205. 
102
 Id. at 209-10. 
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Now the property ain’t worth two nickels. 
When “as is” you take, 
You eat your mistake, 
So bon appetite, Mr. Pickles. 
 
Carroll v. Beardon103 is a case about the sale of a brothel.  The 
general rule is that illegal contracts are void,104 but this case 
illustrates an exception to the rule: the contract is enforceable if the 
party seeking enforcement is not a party to the wrongdoing.105  
This Limerick recites the rule while implying some skepticism as 
to its application in this case: 
In Montana arose a dispute 
O’er a house of doubtful repute. 
The seller madame, 
Not in on the scam 
May partake of her share of the loot. 
 
The Limerick, like the majority’s holding in Carroll, is in some 
tension with the details of the transaction, which make it clear that 
what the court treated as a property sale was actually the sale of an 
on-going business.106  The deal was structured with higher 
payments due during the months when the brothel was likely to 
have more business; thus, the seller was clearly implicated in the 
transaction.  Why did the court ignore these facts?  Perhaps 
because the brothel was a familiar institution of some importance 
to the local economy.107  Its business might have been notorious 
but tolerated by the authorities.  The case invites discussion about 
the interactions of local politics, institutional competence and the 
law.  While the Limerick mimics the court’s representation that the 
seller was not a beneficiary of the brothel’s business, the word 
“loot” expresses skepticism. 
                                                 
103
 381 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1963). 
104
 See id. at 296 (noting that many courts will not aid either party to an 
illegal contract). 
105
 Id. at 296-97. 
106
 See STEWART MACAULEY, et al., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 386-87 
(The Concise Course, 2d ed., 2003) (providing details from deposition testimony 
indicating that the sale price was far in excess of the value of the property and 
that payments were structured to reflect the seasonal rhythms of the prostitution 
business). 
107
 See id. at 387 (suggesting that the court might have been hesitant to shut 
down an illegal business that law enforcement had not shut down, though its 
operation was likely widely known) 
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In Marvin v. Marvin,108 the court ruled that promises made in 
the context of a long-term, non-marital relationship can be 
enforced if they were express or can be safely implied.  I offer two 
Limericks on the subject: 
The Marvin court’s ruling’s propitious  
For relationships non-meretricious. 
Michelle can recover 
From Lee, her ex-lover, 
If his promises weren’t capricious. 
 
Michelle and Lee lived in sin, 
A fact once viewed with chagrin. 
Now she can recover 
From her ex-lover 
If he promised to keep her in gin. 
 
 Sometimes you really can sum up a case in five lines, as this 
Limerick pretty much exhausts the story of Normile v. Miller109 
and serves to remind students that communication of a sale to 
another suffices to revoke an offer: 
As if sensing what lay ahead, 
The counterofferor said, 
“You snooze, you lose!” 
That’s enough to excuse 
Her for selling to Segal instead. 
 
I don’t even assign Krell v. Henry.  I just recite this Limerick and 
save my students some reading: 
Was Henry’s whole purpose frustrated 
When the King burst appendix dictated 
That the crown must delay 
It's coronation day? 
Yes! So contract doctrine’s updated. 
 
Recognizing the element of truth in Karl Llewellyn’s contention 
that it is hard to imagine a less efficient mechanism for the 
communication of useful information than the case method, one 
can supplement that method with some lectures on doctrine.  The 
method can be very efficient if it is interesting.  A summary of 
                                                 
108
 18 Cal.3d 660 (1976). 
109
 326 S.E.2d 11 (NC 1985) 
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legal doctrine punctuated with Limericks can be diverting enough 
to increase the likelihood that students will follow. 
B. Limericks as Illustrations of Types of 
Judicial Reasoning 
Legal Realism arose after the case method and to some extent 
as a reaction against the formalistic approaches associated with 
Langdell and his approach to pedagogy.110  Today, we recognize 
that one very important task of first-year courses is to introduce 
students to different approaches to the law.  Law students must 
understand that different judges will bring different jurisprudential 
values to the cases over which they preside and that those values 
can affect outcomes.  Limericks can help to illustrate this aspect of 
the judicial process. 
For example, first-year contracts courses often have a narrative 
component.  We trace, over the course of the semester the 
development of the law from its more formalistic bent in the 19th 
century into the modern era of the Restatement (2d) and the 
Uniform Commercial Code.  Part of the process involves 
familiarizing students with the differing approaches represented by 
Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin.  Their differences on the 
parol evidence rule are illustrated in Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen.111  Sherrodd, Inc. was a small business that contracted 
with Morrison Knudsen to do some earthmoving work.  Sherrodd 
agreed to do so for a fixed price, but the job turned out to be far 
bigger than expected.112  Morrison-Knudsen allegedly gave oral 
assurances that Sherrodd would be paid based on the work done, 
rather than the flat fee indicated in the parties’ written 
agreement.113  The court sided with Morrison-Knudsen, finding 
that Sherrodd’s allegation of fraud was not the sort that could 
overcome the parol evidence rule.114   
 
Behold, parol’s bitter fruit: 
Sherrodd’s claim was deemed moot! 
                                                 
110
 See Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 613, n.9 (describing the intense criticism 
to which legal realists subjected the case method).   
111
 815 P.2d 1135 (Mont. 1991). 
112




 Id. at 1137. 
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If he only knew, 
The great Corbin would spew 
To see Williston's rule win repute. 
 
The case never ceases to outrage at least some students and thus 
leads to a very fruitful discussion of the pitfalls of oral 
agreements.  In addition, it shows that a formal approach to 
contracts law is still with us.  
Karl Llewellyn is another key figure in the first-year contracts 
narrative narrative.  Students should understand that Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code deviates from the common law in 
ways that are best understood in terms of Karl Llewellyn’s more 
general goal of making commercial law more responsive to the 
actual practices of the people engaged in commercial 
transactions.115    
There once was a man named Llewellyn 
Commercial contracts’ Megellyn 
All stand in awe 
Of his modernized lawe . . .  
Hey!  He modernized contracts, not spellyn! 
 
This Limerick is intended to solidify the character of Llewellyn in 
the students’ consciousness and to help them overcome the feeling 
that his thought must be as impenetrable as is the correct spelling 
of his name (to people not of Scottish extraction). 
In Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey,116 Judge 
Posner labored to explain how one could understand the need for 
the contracts doctrine of “good faith” without resort to moral 
principles.117  Judge Posner attempts to understand the doctrine of 
                                                 
115
 See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 282 (1988) (describing Llewellyn’s 
primary aim as “enforcing trade norms in commercial law). 
116
 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991). 
117
 See id. at 595 (noting that “despite its moralistic overtones,” the concept 
of good faith does not inject moral principles into contract law but merely helps 
to minimize the costs of performance).  Todd D. Rakoff provides a thorough and 
thoughtful discussion of the case in Good Faith in Contract Performance: 
Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187 
(2007). 
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good faith as a mechanism for preventing post-contractual 
opportunistic behavior that could increase transactions costs.118   
“Don’t get moralistic with me,” 
 Said Judge Posner to trustee, GE. 
 “Though when I hear ‘good faith,’ 
 I reach for my [Ring]wraith,119 
 Opportunists ain’t my cup o’ tea.” 
 
This Limerick, is intended to lend a sort of poetic grandeur to 
Judge Posner’s campaign against the conflation of moral and legal 
norms. 
 
In addition to introducing first-year students to different 
judicial philosophies, the case method does provide opportunities 
to introduce students to the challenges of statutory construction 
and to acquaint them the complex relationship between the courts 
and legislatures.  Giving effect to the will of the legislature can be 
a challenge, as illustrated in the classic lost-volume case, Neri v. 
Retail Marine Corp.120 The Court of Appeals’ ruling seems to 
accord with the legislative intent of UCC § 2-708(2), which was 
supposed to be designed to permit the recovery of lost profits. 121  
In order to give effect to that intent, the court had to ignore the last 
phrase of the provision: “due credit for payments or proceeds of 
resale.”122 Neri illustrates the dilemma courts may face when 
confronted with statutory language clearly at odds with the 
drafters’ stated intent.123  While it may seem bold – or even 
                                                 
118
 See 941 F.2d at 595 (“The office of the doctrine of good faith is to forbid 
the kinds of opportunistic behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative 
relationship might enable in the absence of rule.”). 
119
 When I show this Limerick to my students on a PowerPoint slide, it is 
accompanied by a richly detailed artist’s rendering of a Ringwraith from 
Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings.  The image never fails to produce an appreciative 
gasp from the class nerds.  Because I can rely on the image when I show the 
Limerick in class, in that context “Ring” is omitted from the rendition of the 
poem, which makes the line work better metrically. 
120
 285 N.E.2d 311 (NY 1972). 
121
 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§8-9, n.2 (6th ed. 2010) (citing Official Comment 2 to the UCC, which indicated 
the drafters’ intent to “permit the recovery of lost profits” in a lost-volume case). 
122
 Neri, 285 N.E. at 313-315. 
123
 See Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC § 2-708(2) 24 
CASE W. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (1973) (contending that a literal reading of UCC § 
2-708(2) would deny recovery for lost-volume). 
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illegitimate for a court to ignore statutory language, most courts 
have followed Neri and judicially “fixed” what appears to be a 
clear drafting error.124  
 
In Neri, New York’s highest court 
Offered lost volume sellers a port. 
They’d still be at sea 
If New York’s UCC 
Weren’t lopped off a half-sentence short. 
 
The Limerick invites discussions of both statutory interpretation 
and institutional competence.  Students often arrive at law school 
with the notion that legislatures and not judges should make law – 
a rather peculiar prejudice that three years of studying judge-made 
common law often does little to cure.  After the students consider 
the Neri opinion, it is useful to ask students how likely they think a 
state legislature would be to “fix” the working of a section of the 
UCC so as to more accurately reflect the drafters’ meaning.  That 
discussion can then lead into a more general conversation about the 
processes that lead to law-making and law reform. 
C. Limericks as Jurisprudential Critique     
Legal Limericks are a serious business but not a solemn one.  
Limericks can pack a punch and raise serious challenges to legal 
reasoning.  One of the purposes of the case method is to encourage 
students to develop their skills at questioning judicial opinions or 
distinguishing opinions that do not serve their clients’ purposes.  
Limericks can provide a reminder and an example of some of the 
techniques for doing so.   
 Limericks allow instructors to adopt a strong critical voice 
that they need not commit to as their own.  So, for example, in 
Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc.,125 plaintiff attempted to get 
$3000 in credit on a vehicle, which the court assumed to be worth 
significantly less than $3000 based on an allegedly misleading 
advertisement.126  The case turned on whether the advertisement 
                                                 
124
 See e.g., Famous Knitwear v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 
1974) (following Neri’s interpretation of UCC § 2-708(2)); National Controls, 
Inc. v. Commodore Bus. Machines, Inc., 163 Cal.App.3d 688, 697-98 (Cal. App. 
1st Dist. 1985) (noting that courts have uniformly followed Neri’s interpretation 
of UCC § 2-708(2)).    
125
 550 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). 
126
 Id. at 1138 & n.2. 
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was specific enough to constitute an offer directed at Izadi.127  The 
court, displeased at the misleading nature of the advertisement, 
found various justifications for holding that an offer had been 
alleged.128  Arguably, Izadi was not mislead, he was merely 
opportunistic: 
 
Want to make a used-car dealer weep? 
Try to trade in your rusting junk-heap. 
Then pretend that you’re mad 
On account of his ad, 
And seek justice not blind but asleep. 
 
Similarly, the resort to estoppel in Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc.129 is 
open to criticism.  In that case, an employer named Shopmaker 
offered his 67-year-old brother-in-law, Katz, a pension in order to 
lure him into retirement.130  However, shortly after the retirement, 
Katz returned to work part-time for another company and for 
Danny Dare.  Shopmaker then first cut Katz’s pension payments in 
half and then cut them off completely on the ground that Katz was 
employed elsewhere.131   Overturning the trial court’s finding that 
Katz had done nothing in reliance on Shopmaker’s promise to pay 
him a pension, since Katz was an at-will employee and could have 
been fired without a pension, the court found that Katz was entitled 
to the full payment based on promissory estoppel.132 
 
Shopmaker could have fired Katz. 
Instead, they held family chats. 
Now a pension is due, 
Though Katz’ work days aren’t through. 
Estoppel here seems a bit bats. 
 
                                                 
127
 Id. at 1138-39. 
128
 See id. at 1139 (reinstating plaintiff’s breach of contract claim based on 
the court’s characterization of the offer as a “bait and switch”); id. at 1140-41 
(reinstating plaintiff’s statutory claims for violations of Florida’s Deceptive and 
Unfair Trade Practices Act). 
129
 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App.1980). 
130
 Id. at 123.  Katz also had some physical and mental impairments because 





 Id. at 124-26. 
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The case and the Limerick provide an opportunity to discuss 
litigation strategies.  It seems clear that Danny Dare breached a 
promise to Katz.  Why was that promise not treated as a 
contractual obligation?  Why did the court focus on promissory 
estoppel, which seemed a stretch in this case? 
In Fitzpatrick v. Michael,133 the court found itself unable to 
provide a remedy for plaintiff, Marie Fitzpatrick, who had taken 
care of an elderly man at a very low wage in return for a promise 
that she would inherit his property upon his demise.  Although the 
court first announced that “[t]here can be no possible doubt that 
upon these facts the plaintiff should be entitled to some relief 
against the defendant,”134 it was unwilling to compel the defendant 
“to accept the personal services of an employee against his wish 
and his will.”135  This Limerick imagines a judge less bound by 
convention: 
I now pronounce you and Marie 
To be bound by this solemn decree: 
She will be your nurse, 
‘Til you leave in a hearse; 
You owe that to your promisee. 
 
I suggest to my students that if the judge explained to Mr. Michael 
that Ms. Fitzpatrick would live in his house, cook for him, care for 
him and nurse him in illness until the day he died, Mr. Michael 
would likely negotiate a settlement that would benefit both parties 
and not leave Ms. Fitzpatrick uncompensated for her labor.   
This prediction is then undercut by the next case we discuss, 
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin,136 in which Mr. and Mrs. Brackenbury 
sought the specific performance of a promise from Mrs. 
Brackenbury’s mother, Sarah Hodgkin that, if they would care for 
her, she would let them live in her house and take possession of it 
after her death.137  The court granted the relief sought, essentially 
ordering Mrs. Hodgkin to continue to live with her daughter and 
son-in-law.138  One might expect that some sort of settlement 
would result, especially since Mrs. Hodgkin’s son Walter was a co-
                                                 
133
 9 A.2d 639 (Md. 1939). 
134
 Id. at 641. 
135
 Id. at 643. 
136
 102 A. 106 (Me. 1917). 
137
 Id. at 107. 
138
 Id. at 108. 
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defendant in the case, as she had sought to transfer title of her 
home to him.139  The transfer could now proceed with appropriate 
compensation being paid.  As even Mrs. Hodgkin’s great grandson 
described her as “irascible,” one would expect that the 
Brackenbury family would be eager to accept payment and 
leave.140  But Mr. and Mrs. Brackenbury and Mrs. Hodgkin 
decided to tough it out.  According to one of Mrs. Hodgkin’s sons, 
at meal times, food was not passed to Mrs. Hodgkin but thrown, 
and she was forced to eat with an old iron fork with two tines 
broken off,141 a fact that inspired the following Limerick: 
I’d sooner kiss a chimera 
Than put up with my in-law, Old Sarah, 
Now whenever she dines, 
Her fork has but two tines, 
And her home ain’t no French Riviera. 
 
One last example: in Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil 
Co.,142 the Ninth Circuit used trade usage and course of 
performance evidence to override the express terms of an asphalt 
provision agreement, stating that Nanakuli would pay Shell’s 
posted price on the date of delivery.143  The court manufactured a 
new standard in justifying its practice, stating that such evidence 
could be used to “cut down” but not to contradict an express price 
term.144  It provided, as an example of an interpretation that would 
contradict the express price term, one in which Nanakuli’s price 
rather than Shell’s would govern.145 
Was the Ninth Circuit snorting patchouli 
Letting parol in to help Nanakuli? 
Shell Oil was brought low 
                                                 
139
 Id. at 107. 
140
 See MACAULEY, et al. at 284 (citing Douglas I. Hodgkin). 
141
 Id. (citing Mrs. Brackenbury’s younger brother).  The casebook recounts 
other litigation involving the family.  Not surprisingly, Mrs. Hodgkin’s will was 
contested.  Id. 
142
 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981). 
143
 Id. at 780-806. 
144
 Id. at 805. 
145
 Id. 
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As if by a blow 
From the club of a trade-use Gillooly.146 
The opinion certainly provides ample justification for the court’s 
decision to protect the price Nankuli paid for asphalt.  However, it 
also provides an opportunity for a drafting exercise.  One can first 
ask the students to try to redraft the price term of the agreement 
between Shell and Nanakuli so as to make clear that there would 
be no price protection.  There can follow a discussion of why the 
parties might not have made their intentions with respect to price 
protection clearer in the original version. 
CONCLUSION 
Even Langdell’s critics have acknowledged that the case 
method has its advantages.  One such advantage is the method’s 
flexibility.  The case method can be supplemented with lectures 
and problems or with technological aids that promote more active, 
in-class engagement with case law.  Legal Limericks are a handy 
tool that a contracts professor can have in her bag as a means of 
enhancing the case-law approach to legal education.  Langdell’s 
nineteenth-century methodology can be made more relevant to 
twenty-first century legal training through this humble eighteenth-
century poetic form. 
                                                 
146
 Jeff Gillooly pleaded guilty to having taken a club to the knee of figure 
skater Nancy Kerrigan at the 1994 U.S. Olympic Trials.   A PowerPoint slide 
showing Nancy Kerrigan forcing a smile while seated next to Tonya Harding is 
usually enough to jog students’ memories. 
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Appendix 
Langdellian Limericks  
The Complete Collection 
Part I: Formation 
 
Hurley v. Eddingfield 
 
Though his patient’s pallor was green 
The doctor would not intervene. 
This no-house-calls sort 
Was indulged by the court,  
Which considered his conduct obscene. 
 
Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc. 
 
Ray’s specs were enough to confound 
These “hatchet and saw” men, whose ground 
For breaching the pact 
Was mistake of fact, 
But they signed it, and so they are bound. 
 
Park 100 Investors v. Kartes 
 
The Karteses signed the “lease papers,” 
A guaranty hidden in vapors. 
The court found this coarse 
And would not enforce 
A contract procured through such capers. 
 
Lefkowitz v. Great Minn. Surplus Store 
 
Mo Lefkowitz made his career 
Finding ads explicit and clear. 
He’s the first to the store; 
Now he’s got furs galore, 
And the price that he pays isn’t dear. 
 
Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc.  
 
Want to make a used-car dealer weep? 
Try to trade in your rusting junk-heap, 
Then pretend that you’re mad 
On account of his ad 
And seek justice not blind but asleep. 
Leonard v. Pepsico 
 
Intent to be bound was a barrier 
To Leonard’s acquiring a Harrier. 
Now he only drinks Coke, 
And he gets every joke 
But I would not say he’s much merrier. 
 
Doe  v. One America Productions 
 
Some guys who got drunk during “Borat” 
Signed releases with terms they’re now sore at. 
Though they waived every right, 
They sued claiming false light, 
Giving students a claim they can roar at. 
 
Normile v. Miller 
 
As if sensing what lay ahead, 
The counterofferor said 
“You snooze you lose.”  
That’s enough to excuse 
Her for selling to Segal instead. 
 
Fischer v. Union Trust 
 
Consideration provision is tough: 
One dollar isn’t enough. 
Has this court grown weary 
Of peppercorn theory 






  Langdellian Limericks 35 
Hamer v. Sidway 
 
Did dissolute William fulfill 
A promise to rich Uncle Will? 
Yes, forbearance from vice, 
Said the court, will suffice 
As performance, and so it is still. 
 
Intro to the UCC 
 
There once was a man named Llewellyn, 
Commercial contracts’ Meggellyn. 
All stand in awe 
Of his modernized lawe. 
Hey! He modernized contracts, not spellyn! 
 
Battle of the Forms Limerick 
 
To rhyme on the battle of forms 
Would intrude upon poetic norms. 
2-207 in verse 
Might even be worse 
Than an ode to the new tax reforms. 
 
Hill v. Gateway 
 
Could a problem with contract formation 
Save the Hills from forced arbitration? 
No, the court will compel, 
And consign you to Dell. 
It ain’t court, but it sure beats damnation. 
 
Klocek v. Gateway  
 
UCC Section 2-207 
Provided the unlikely leaven. 
Ralph Nader is smiling 
And consumers are filing 
In Kansas, the new plaintffs’ heaven. 
 
Colonial Dodge v. Miller 
 
Before you purchase a good, 
It’s best to look under the hood. 
The good here is a dodge, 
The case, a hodgepodge, 
And the law not well understood. 
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Part II: Promissory Estoppel and Charitable Subscriptions 
 
Kirksey v. Kirksey 
 
From a house to a hut to the street 
Was the course of Ms. Kirksey’s retreat 
She could not recover 
From her in-law (her lover?) 
Who’d nakedly promised a suite. 
 
Greiner v. Greiner 
 
At wheat-sowing time, in a bank, 
Maggie promised some acreage to Frank. 
“He did nothing for me!” 
Averred Maggie, with glee. 
For his land Frank has Corbin to thank. 
 
Rickets v. Scothorn 
 
This was the start of estoppel: 
Said Grandpa to Katie, “Poppop’ll 
Set you up nice.” 
She took his advice, 
And left her old job in the shop-pel. 
 
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores 
 
Hoffman moved from Wautoma to Chilton 
And his finances were slowly wiltin’. 
Because legal science 
Protects sound reliance, 
He recovered from Red Owl’s jiltin’. 
or 
He’s more popular than Paris Hilton 
 
Katz v. Danny Dare 
 
Shopmaker could have fired Katz, 
But instead they had family chats. 
Now a pension is due, 
Though Katz’ work days aren’t through. 
Estoppel here seems a bit bats. 
 
 
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. 
 
When they offered a bid to James Baird, 
Gimbel Brothers egregiously erred. 
They were in deep shinoleum 
For not laying linoleum, 
But Judge Hand, their bottoms he spared. 
 
Drennan v. Star Paving  
 
After reading the views of Judge Hand, 
Star Paving could not understand 
What the fuss was about. 
Bidders used to bail out; 




Although her estate was inheritable, 
Ms. Johnston chose to be charitable. 
A bargain was struck,  
Her heir’s out of luck: 
To the College Cardozo was fairitable. 
 
King v. Boston University 
 
Coretta Scott King’s defiance 
Could not overcome legal science. 
The gift is a fact 
Because it was backed 
By consideration (or reliance). 
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Part III: Restitution and Moral Consideration 
 
Credit Bureau Enterprises, Inc. v. Pelo 
 
Does the doctrine of restitution 
Provide for a fair resolution? 
It keeps doctors secure  
Though consent is obscure 
And thus may prevent self-execution. 
 
Oliver v. Campbell 
 
Campbell wasn’t unjustly enriched 
By the lawyer whose contract he’d ditched. 
Counsel could have earned more 
If he’d been fired before 
Or claimed Campbell’s wife was bewitched. 
 
Mills v. Wyman 
 
Seth Wyman’s interior forum 
Is not the law’s sanctum sanctorum 
With this none would quarrel: 
Seth’s conduct’s immoral. 
Still, he breaches not law but decorum. 
 
Webb v. McGowin 
 
After giving the pine block a toss, 
Webb spotted McGowin, his boss. 
Preventing the harm 
Cost a leg and an arm 
The estate must extinguish Webb’s loss. 
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Part IV: Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence 
 
 
Thompson v. Libby 
 
A plan to buy logs fit for yule 
Met up with the “four-corners” rule; 
The parties, they feuded 
But the court, it excluded 
Parol. How Grinchy! How cruel! 
 
Sherrodd v. Morrison-Knudsen 
 
Behold, parol’s bitter fruit: 
Sherrodd’s claim was deemed moot. 
If he only knew, 
The great Corbin would spew 
To see Williston’s rule win repute.  
 
Winternitz v. Summit Hills 
 
Hard cases result in bad laws. 
But there’s a solution because 
The court can resort 
To a sort of a tort 
To remedy equity’s flaws. 
 
Alaska Democrats v. Rice 
 
This just in from our anchor, Ted Koppel: 
The Statute of Frauds just may topple. 
Politicians are snarky, 
And yet their malarchy 
Is binding if backed by estoppel. 
 
Buffaloe v. Hart 
 
Acceptance of “goods” was the start 
Of Buffaloe’s barn deal with Hart. 
A torn check was the end, 
Evincing a trend 
To bind through Llewellyn’s black art. 
 
Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo’s, Inc. 
 
Addressing the judge as “Coxcomb-a,” 
Mama Rizzo flew back to Roma. 
In rejecting her Answer, 
This judge has cured cancer, 
The dread basil sale carcinoma. 
 
Fitzpatrick v. Michael 
 
I now pronounce you and Marie 
To be bound by this solemn decree: 
She will be your nurse, 
‘Til you leave in a hearse; 
You owe that to your promisee. 
 
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin 
 
I’d sooner kiss a chimera 
Than put up with my in-law, Old Sarah, 
Now whenever she dines, 
Her fork has but two tines, 
And her home ain’t no French Riviera. 
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Part V: Incomplete Contracts and Interpretation 
 
Raffles v. Wichelhaus 
 
In Peerless, a contract for cotton 
Was found by the court to be rotten. 
To Liverpool sailed 
Two ships that so hailed 
No consensus ad idem was gotten. 
 
Dunnebacke v. Pittman 
 
Mrs. Gilligan was not in thrall; 
No agreement could she recall. 
Pittman may lose his biz, 
But something there is 
That doesn’t love a wall. 
 
Frigaliment v. B.N.S. 
 
Of Judge Friendly’s great chicken coup, 
Shakespeare’s witches could make much ado 
With Defendants they’d howl, 
“Foul is fair, fair is fowl” 
That is, chickens fit only for stew. 
Nanakuli Paving v. Shell Oil 
 
Was the Ninth Circuit snorting patchouli 
Letting parol in to help Nanakuli? 
Shell Oil was brought low 
As if by a blow 
From the bat of a trade-use Gillooly. 
 
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon 
 
The Titanic’s wreck, that was rough, 
But nothing could sink Lady Duff! 
Lucy’s couture 
Is now de rigeur; 
But Wood gets to market her stuff. 
 
Clark v. West 
 
Was Clark due six dollars a page 
For his work as a bibulous sage? 
Yes, be West’s own volition 
It waived the condition 
Of temperance for the man it engaged. 
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Part VI: Excuse 
Balfour v. Balfour  
Balfour gave in to his id, 
And stopped paying his wife thirty quid. 
His word has no force, 
For, before their divorce, 
The pair did not think that it did. 
 
Marvin v. Marvin 
 
The Marvin court’s ruling’s propitious  
For relationships non-meretricious. 
Michelle can recover 
From Lee, her ex-lover, 
If his promises weren’t capricious. 
or 
Michelle and Lee lived in sin, 
A fact once viewed with chagrin. 
Now she can recover 
From her ex-lover 
If he promised to keep her in gin. 
 
Borelli v. Brusseau (Majority) 
 
Is only the one in the blouse 
Expected to care for her spouse? 
No, the same law applies  
To the gals and the guys 
Who must care for their partners in-house. 
 
(Dissent) 
Is only the one in the blouse 
Expected to care for her spouse? 
Love, Honor, Cherish 
And clean bed-pans – that’s marriage! 
A housewife’s still wed to a house. 
 
Carroll v. Beardon 
 
In Montana arose a dispute 
O’er a house of doubtful repute. 
The seller madame, 
Not in on the scam 
May partake of her share of the loot. 
 
In re Baby M  
 
“Illegal, criminal and void!” 
Cried the court, more than slightly annoyed. 
“Let’s put a lid  
On this sale of a kid.” 
But who’ll pay for her sessions with Freud? 
 
Totten v. United States 
  
The President gamely employed 
 But then stiffed an agent named Lloyd. 
 Abe knew Lee’s plan 
 Because of this man, 
 But the court found his legal claims void.  
 
Sherwood v. Walker 
 
Because of a mutual mistake, 
Poor Rose was thought of as steak. 
But the court did discover 
Her essence was “lover” 
So Sherwood made do with milk shake. 
 
Lewanee County v. Messerly 
 
The waste leaked in torrents, not trickles. 
Now the property ain’t worth two nickels. 
When “as is” you take, 
You eat your mistake, 
So bon appetite, Mr. Pickles. 
 
Market Street Associates v. Frey 
 
“Don’t get moralistic with me,” 
 Said Judge Posner to trustee, GE. 
 ”Though when I hear ‘good faith,’ 
 I reach for my wraith. 
 Opportunists ain’t my cup o’ tea.” 
 
 




Locke v. Warner Brothers 
 
There once was an actress named Locke 
Whose Ratboy was thought to be schlock. 
Old Clint and Warner 
Thought they could scorn her 
But bad faith they neglected to grok. 
 
Donahue v. FedEx 
 
Plaintiff, an employee at will, 
Thought his boss had a hand in the till. 
FedEx is correct; 
“Bad faith” won’t protect 
Those whose policy contentions are nil. 
 
Syester v. Banta 
 
In the shallow end of the gene pool: 
Met a widow and a young dancing fool 
Who had to teach her for squat 
How to waltz and foxtrot 
Because misleading widows is cruel. 
 
Selmer v. Blakeslee-Midwest 
 
In Selmer v. Blakeslee-Midwest, 
Judge Posner creates a new test. 
Mere business stress 
Does not make duress. 
Thus breaching parties are blessed. 
 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
 
When he learned of Ms. Williams’ plight, 
“Unconscionable!” said Skelly-Wright 
If you sell door-to-door 
The court may abhor 








Burch v. Second Judicial District 
 
If you don’t think to file for mandamus, 
Your client may shout, “Ignoramus!” 
Now after appeal, 
The Burches can squeal 
“We may not be rich but we’re famous!” 
 
Taylor v. Caldwell 
 
Taylor rented a hall like the Met’s 
For the purpose of concerts and fetes 
When fire the hall downed 
The court kindly found 
A way to excuse Caldwell’s debts. 
 
Krell v. Henry 
 
Was Henry’s whole purpose frustrated 
When the King’s burst appendix dictated 
The crown must delay 
Its Coronation Day? 
Yes!  So contracts doctrine’s updated. 
 
Transatlantic Financing v.  
United States 
 
His passage through Suez foreclosed, 
Plaintiff sailed ‘round the horn and supposed 
He’d find some utility 
In impracticability 
But Skelly Wright found he gets hosed. 
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Part VII: Remedies 
 
Parker v. 20th Century Fox 
 
The studio’s conduct was terrible 
And the actress’s damage repairable 
Only with a lead part 
In a great work of art: 
A film that is at least comparable. 
 
Neri v. Retail Marine Corp. 
 
In Neri, New York’s highest court 
Offered lost volume sellers a port. 
They’d still be at sea 
If New York’s UCC 
Weren’t lopped off a half-sentence short. 
 
Hadley v. Baxandale 
 
Foresee that things can end badly. 
And keep that in mind, or else sadly, 
A life of regret 
Is all you will get 
If your harm’s consequential – poor Hadley! 
 
Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead 
 
If drive-ins were all ever green, 
Lost profits would be routine, 
Though the business be new, 
And the picture askew, 
Showing Michael Moore naked on screen. 
 
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal 
 
Before you let Garland Coal 
Turn your backyard into a hole, 
Make sure that your land 
Is worth 25 grand 





Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
 
Kent called for beheading or stripes 
When his builder eschewed Reading pipes. 
There was no harm financial; 
The court found substantial 
Performance, ignoring Kent’s gripes. 
 
Sullivan v. O’Connor 
 
Assessing a botched operation 
Requires tort-like harm calculation. 
Suffering and pain 
Invade contracts domain 
Both as reliance and expectation.
  
